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Abstract: In their paper, "Towards a Theory of Emotional Communication," Anne Bartsch and Susanne Hübner outline a model of emotional communication where emotional communication is
conceptualized as a process of mutual influence between the emotions of communication partners.
To elaborate this general notion further, four working definitions of emotional communication are
introduced, each of which is based on a different theory of emotions. In the second part of the paper, an integrative framework is proposed that reconciles the four working definitions and their
underlying theories of emotion. According to this framework, emotional communication comprises
three interrelated levels of complexity: 1) innate stimulus-response-patterns, 2) associative schemata, and 3) symbolic meaning. Finally, Bartsch and Hübner discuss how emotional communication can be described in terms of general communication theory, and conclude that the three complexity levels are heterogeneous with regard to definitional issues in general communication theory. Hence, emotional communication cannot be subsumed under a single theory of communication.
Taken separately, however, each complexity level of emotional communication can be related
meaningfully to approaches in general communication theory.
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Anne BARTSCH and Susanne HÜBNER
Towards a Theory of Emotional Communication
Over the past two decades, emotions have become a rapidly growing field of research and theorizing in disciplines as different as cognitive, social, and developmental psychology, anthropology,
linguistics, neuroscience, philosophy, and others. One of the central themes that emerged from the
joint efforts of emotion research is that emotions are not just private inner experiences, but inherently social and communicative phenomena. In this paper, we explore the following: If emotions
are inherently social and communicative, is it also true that communication is inherently emotional? To date, communication has mainly been conceptualized as a process of exchange, mutual influence, co-orientation, normative control, etc., of cognitive information processing. But what if we
think of communication as a process of exchange, mutual influence, co-orientation, and normative
control of emotions? We do not propose, however, that this view with focus on emotion would exclude the cognitive approach; rather, we explore the role of emotions and their specific contribution to the process of communication. Further, we outline a model of emotional communication
where the objective of the model is to integrate recent developments in emotion research into a
communication-theoretical framework (see Bartsch and Hübner). What exactly do we mean by
"emotional communication"? The basic idea of the theoretical framework we propose is that people
do not only communicate in order to exchange information, but also in order to exchange emotions. In other words, emotional communication is conceptualized as a process of mutual influence
between the emotions of communication partners. To elaborate this general concept of emotional
communication further, we propose four working definitions, each based on a different theory of
emotion. The first working definition is based on neuroscience models, the second on appraisal
theories, the third is based on the prototype approach, and the fourth on social constructivist theories of emotion. The four emotion theories mentioned are chosen because each provides us with
an explicit and detailed account of the processes that give rise to emotions. For, if we know the
processes that give rise to emotions, we may be able to explain how these processes are influenced by similar processes in other people.
Neuroscience models of emotion assume that emotions are caused by specialized brain systems (see, e.g., LeDoux; Panksepp; Damasio). Basically, emotional brain systems have two functions: First, they analyze the emotional meaning of stimuli. This is accomplished by associative
paring of stimulus features with innate emotion elicitors. Interestingly, emotion expressions of
others seem to count among these innate emotion elicitors. Emotional brain systems are involved
in the processing of expression of others critically. Second, emotional brain systems control a variety of emotional responses such as hormone release, activation of the autonomic nervous system,
vocal, facial, and motor expression, allocation of cognitive resources to the situation that elicits
emotion, etc. Taken together, these functional properties of emotional brain systems lead to the
following conclusion: If the same brain systems that give rise to emotions are also involved in the
expression of emotions and in the processing of expressions of others, emotion expression will
then lead to an activation of similar brain systems in communication partners. Thus, on the basis
of neuroscience models of emotion, emotional communication can be defined as a process of reciprocal activation of emotional brain systems. Appraisal theories of emotion describe the processes
that give rise to emotions at a quite different level of analysis. According to appraisal theories
emotions are elicited by cognitive appraisals (see, e.g., Lazarus; Scherer; Smith and Ellswort;
Ortony, Clore, and Collins; Frijda). Appraisal criteria relevant to emotion include novelty, valence,
goal conductiveness, certainty vs. uncertainty of outcomes, self vs. other's agency, coping potential, and normative evaluation. Each emotion is caused by a specific pattern of appraisals. Emotion
expression is, therefore, assumed to carry detailed information about cognitive appraisals. Some
appraisal theorists even believe that emotion expressions are composed of several muscle movements, each of which signals a different appraisal component. For example, according to Klaus R.
Scherer, the appraisal information conveyed by emotion expression can be used by communication
partners in two ways: The appraisals of others can be used to resolve ambiguities in one's own
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appraisal of the situation and appraisals can be used to infer the motives and the likely behavior of
others (which are often relevant to one's own appraisal of the situation). To summarize, emotion
expression carries appraisal information that is likely to affect the appraisals of others, and consequently does affect their emotions. Thus, on the basis of appraisal theories, emotional communication can be defined as a process of information exchange about cognitive appraisals.
The prototype approach was developed originally as a theory of natural language concepts and
it was applied to emotions by Shaver and his colleagues (see Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, O'Connor;
Fischer, Shaver, Carnochan). The prototype approach assumes that knowledge about emotions is
represented in the form of nonverbal emotion scripts. Emotional scripts include knowledge about
typical eliciting situations, typical reactions, and self-control procedures. These emotion prototypes
have two closely related functions: They structure the personal experience of emotions and they
are used to understand the emotions of others. This double function of emotional scripts in emotion elicitation and emotion perception leads to the following conclusion: If the same knowledge
structures are activated when experiencing an emotion and when observing emotions in others,
the vicarious experience of an emotion must then have essential features that correspond to the
personal experience of an emotion. The person who experiences an emotion vicariously may be
aware that the emotion actually "belongs" to someone else, but nevertheless she/he will experience an emotion. Thus, on the basis of the prototype approach, emotional communication can be
defined as a process of reciprocal activation of emotional scripts. Next, social constructivist theories of emotion also assume that emotion concepts play a causal role in emotion elicitation (see,
e.g., Averill; Harré; Shweder; Lutz; on [radical] constructivism, see Riegler
<http://www.radicalconstructivism.com>). Social constructivists, however, believe that emotional
knowledge is represented in a purely symbolic manner. According to this view, the meaning of
emotion words is constituted by a set of rules that specify the kinds of persons, situations, and
actions to which the emotion word applies. The rules that govern the use of emotion words and
other symbolic expressions are thought to be equivalent to the social norms concerning emotions.
In turn, this means that if a person finds herself/himself in a situation to which a specific emotion
word applies, this person has both the moral right and the moral obligation to experience the emotion and to behave accordingly. Therefore, emotions can be considered as social roles (see, e.g.,
Averill). As with social roles in general, the individual is not free to self-ascribe emotions at will.
The self-ascription of emotions must not only rely on culturally determined emotion rules and in
order to become a fact of socially shared reality, emotional roles must be authorized and reciprocated by complementary role behavior of others. The implications of this theory for the concept of
emotional communication are straight forward: If emotions do exist only as a fact of socially
shared reality, the existence of an emotion in the heads of other people is then as constitutive to
the emotion as its existence in the head of the person having the emotion. Thus, on the basis of
social constructivist theories of emotion, emotional communication can be defined as a process of
symbolic negotiation of emotions.
To summarize, the four emotion theories introduced above clearly support the assumption that
the emotions of communication partners influence each other. This is quite remarkable given that
these theories describe the processes that give rise to emotions in quite different terms. Appraisal
theories consider the emotion eliciting process as a form of cognition, whereas neuroscience models claim that emotion and cognition are distinct forms of information processing. The prototype
approach assumes that knowledge about emotions is represented in the form of nonverbal prototypes, whereas social constructivist theories claim that emotion concepts are symbolic representations. Neuroscience models describe emotions as bodily phenomena, whereas social constructivist
theories consider them as purely mental constructs, etc. On the one hand, there are four good
reasons to believe that the emotions of communication partners influence each other. On the other
hand, there are multiple reasons to doubt whether the four emotion theories mean the same thing
when they speak of emotions. If the concepts of emotion implied in these theories cannot be reconciled, it would be misleading to apply the same term "emotional communication" to all of the
working definitions derived there from. We are convinced, however, that this is not the case. For,
in spite of the fact that there are substantial controversies between the proponents of strong ver-
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sions of the four emotion theories, there are also moderate and intermediate positions trying to
reconcile them. It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss in detail why we believe that the
strong versions are wrong and why we propose hat the conciliatory versions are right (on this, see
Bartsch and Hübner). Basically, the answer depends on the position one takes with respect to the
Zajonc-Lazarus debate about the primacy of affect over cognition, or vice versa, the imagery debate, the nature-nurture debate, and the mind-body problem. As this impressive list of unresolved
controversies shows clearly enough, our position, favoring a unified theory of emotion would be
open to criticism in multiple ways. If we suppose, however, that the emotion theories considered
describe important aspects of the same phenomenon, then a comprehensive theory of emotional
communication would have to take into account the entire range of processes specified by the four
working definitions. One important step towards an integrated theory of emotional communication
is the assumption that different levels of cognitive complexity are involved in emotion elicitation.
Such hierarchies of complexity levels are proposed by scholars across the whole field of emotion
theory and can therefore be seen as a common denominator. The three levels of cognitive complexity that are mentioned most often are innate stimulus-response patterns, associative schemata, and symbolic concepts.
If we assume that at least three levels of cognitive complexity are involved in emotion, the
next question we need to ask is how are the different levels interacting? Most theories are not very
specific with regard to this question and it is often assumed that these different levels work in parallel and contribute to the final product of emotion in an additive manner. In our opinion, the most
elaborate version of an emotional processing hierarchy is proposed by Kurt Fischer, Philipp R.
Shaver, and Peter Carnochan in their paper published in 1990, "How Emotions Develop and How
They Organize Development." According to Fischer, Shaver, and Carnochan, the different levels of
cognitive complexity emerge in a fixed sequence during child development. The most basic level
consists of innate stimulus-response patterns. This level is present at birth, whereas the levels of
associative schemata and symbolic concepts emerge at about four months and two years, respectively. A central assumption of the model is that higher levels of cognitive complexity such as associative schemata and symbolic concepts are composed of simple cognitive skills on the more
basic levels. The emergence of superordinate skills leads to a reorganization and differentiation of
the basic skills. Nevertheless, the skills on the subordinate levels continue to function independently of the newly acquired level of cognitive complexity. Thus the subordinate levels can
work without the superordinate levels, but not vice versa. How, then, can the four working definitions be located within this hierarchy of cognitive skills? At least three of the emotion theories considered have clear affinities to one of the complexity levels. Neuroscience models are primarily
about innate stimulus-response patterns, the prototype approach applies to associative schemata,
and social constructivist theories deal with symbolic emotion concepts. The only approaches that
cannot be easily identified with any of these levels are appraisal theories where the process of appraisal is basically the same for all three levels of cognitive complexity (see Lazarus; Leventhal
and Scherer; Smith and Kirby). The situation is appraised with respect to the same set of appraisal
criteria and the same patterns of appraisal lead to the same emotional reactions. Thus, the working definition based on appraisal theories would apply equally to all three levels of emotional
communication. Taken together, the argumentation considered here leads to a model of emotional
communication that comprises three interrelated levels of complexity. Level one consists of the
reciprocal activation of emotional brain systems, level two consists of the reciprocal activation of
emotional scripts, and level three consists of the symbolic negotiation of emotions. In addition, all
three levels can be characterized as a process of information exchange about cognitive appraisals.
Further, as a consequence of the interrelated architecture of cognitive complexity levels, our model
posits that the emotional exchange processes specified by the four working definitions contribute
to a unified process of communication. As already mentioned, the model of Fischer, Shaver and
Carnochan assumes that processing skills on the superordinate levels are composed of simple processing skills on the subordinate levels. Thus, the superordinate levels of emotional communication
involve automatically communication on the more basic levels. This means, for instance, that emotional communication on a symbolic level will not work if it does not activate nonverbal emotion
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scripts, which, in turn, depends on the activation of emotional brain systems. However, despite its
dependence on basic levels, each of the higher levels of emotional communication does add new
constraints and new degrees of freedom to communication processes on its subordinate levels.
Thus, it can be hypothesized that an important function of the higher levels is to regulate emotional communication on the more basic levels.
Another implication of the interrelated organization of cognitive complexity levels is that the
model allows for communication processes that cross level boundaries. In other words, the level of
cognitive complexity that is used to express an emotion can differ from the level of cognitive complexity that is used to interpret the expression. This is possible because the cognitive structures
that underlie the four levels are closely intertwined. As a consequence, typical aspects of emotion
expressions on one level often coincide with typical aspects of emotion expressions on other levels.
Such coincidences make it possible that emotion expressions are reframed by communication
partners on a different level of cognitive complexity. For example, innate emotion expressions can
be interpreted as a symbolic act of role assertion if the expression is associated with a conventionalized social meaning in a given culture. On the other hand, symbolic expressions can trigger innate response tendencies if they mimic typical stimulus features of innate emotion elicitors. This
seems to be the case, for instance, with music. Studies of music perception find that the emotional
impact of music is predicted by the same acoustic features that characterize the vocal expression
of emotions (see, e.g., Juslin and Sloboda). To summarize, our model of emotional communication
comprises three levels of complexity. Level one consists in the reciprocal activation of emotional
brain systems. Level two consists in the reciprocal activation of emotional scripts. Level three consists in the symbolic negotiation of emotions. The three levels are interrelated in such a way that
the higher levels of emotional communication automatically involve communication processes on
the more basic levels. We propose the hypothesis that an important function of the superordinate
levels is to regulate emotional communication on the subordinate levels. Such a model allows for
communication processes that cross level boundaries, because typical aspects of emotion expressions on one level often coincide with typical aspects of emotion expression on other levels. However, one question remains: In how far is it justified to consider the emotional exchange processes
described by the model as a form of communication? A wide range of general communication theories are based on concepts referring to symbolic forms of exchanging messages. To mention some
examples, symbolic communication theories include: Rational Argumentation Theory (Cox and
Willard), Symbolic Convergence Theory (Bormann; Bormann, Cragan, Shields), Narrative Paradigm
Theory (Fischer), and in the domain of social psychology Symbolic Interactionism (Mead). Of
course, each theory is based on specific concepts like rational arguments, fantasy themes, stories,
and meanings, but all theories have in common that they describe communication as a symbolic
message transfer between sender and receiver (symbolic, in so far as all theories mentioned include the application of symbol systems like language, descriptive gestures, reference objects,
etc.).
What does this mean for our model of emotional communication? The highest complexity level
of the model -- level three -- clearly meets the criteria proposed by symbolic communication theories, such as symbol systems, conventionalized meanings, etc. To give you an example, Symbolic
Interactionism in the tradition of George Mead can be applied in a meaningful way to the symbolic
negotiation of emotions on level three. The theoretical starting point of Symbolic Interactionism is
that no kind of meaning exists outside of the interaction between people. In other words, meaning
is considered as a shared response to each term, which in the course of interaction has achieved
the status of a significant symbol and the meaning of which is shared by a community. With respect to emotional communication, this means, that not the emotional expression or the understanding is negotiated in the communication process but the meaning of emotion within the social
context. To summarize, the mainstream of general communication theories based on criteria such
as symbolic message exchange and rationality can be applied to level three of our model. Levels
one and two, however, refer to non-symbolic forms of message exchange. The number of communication theories that deal with such non-symbolic forms of communication is significantly smaller.
However, there is a series of approaches that describe nonverbal behavior and its function in
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communication process such as Proxemics, Kinesics, Paralanguage, or Vocalics, and similar theories such as Interpersonal Deception Theory (Buller and Burgoon), Expectancy Violation Theory
(Burgoon), Marital Communication Theory (Fitzpatrick), pragmatic communication theories in the
tradition of Paul Watzlawick, etc. Generally speaking, these theories can be subsumed under the
term of nonverbal interaction theories. To summarize the common theoretical statements, all of
these theories are based on the assumption that an adequate understanding of message transfer
in social contexts requires a consideration of nonverbal cues as an information channel to convey
knowledge about each other. Nonverbal interaction theories can be applied to the second level of
our model, which is the level of nonverbal emotion scripts. On the basis of emotional knowledge
which is organized in script-like structures with a beginning and an end, communication partners
develop expectations about the course of interaction. Moreover, the chronological structure of
scripts enables the participants to shape intentions to regulate this interaction. It is important to
note that criteria such as reciprocal expectations and intentions, which play a central role in nonverbal interaction theories, do not necessarily mean self-conscious expectations and intentions.
Rather, expectations and intentions are based on implicit characteristics of interaction such as the
temporal unfolding of interaction scripts. Finally, let us turn to the neurological level. Only a few
approaches try to explain the biological foundations of human communication. Among these theories are: The Autopoietic Systems Theory of Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, the
Communibiology Approach of Michal J. Beatty and James C. McCroskey, and the Theory of Spontaneous Communication of Ross Buck. The theory of Buck is the most explicit with regard to the influence of genes on the reciprocal activation of emotional brain systems. Similar to all evolutionary
approaches, Buck assumes that social communication has an evolved basis in innate displays and
pre-attunements, which are determined genetically and serve the co-orientation of attention. According to the communicative gene hypothesis of Ross Buck and Benson E. Ginsburg, not only the
emotional display is innate but also the skill to receive emotional signals. Since, from an evolutionary perspective, innate expression skills appear reasonable, only if there exist also innate receiving
skills. This leads to the conclusion that there are not only selfish genes, but also social genes that
enable communicative co-orientation.
To conclude, there is no single communication theory that covers the entire bandwidth of emotional communication processes specified by the four working definitions. The widespread concept
of communication as a symbolic message transfer can be applied only to level three. The description of emotional communication at the more basic levels requires a concept of communication
which includes innate co-orientation processes and reciprocal formation of expectations based on
emotional scripts. That means that the phenomenon of emotional communication is quite heterogeneous with regard to definitional issues in general communication theory. Hence it cannot be
treated within a single theory of communication. Rather, there are interesting parallels in the controversies about emotion and the controversies about communication. These parallels make emotional communication an especially promising subject for communication theory and research.
Note: The above paper is an updated version of Anne Bartsch and Susanne Hübner, "Die Macht der Emotionen.
Zur aufmerksamlitenden Funktion von Emotionen in medialen Dipositiven" in SPIEL: Siegener Periodicum zur
Internationalen Empirischen Literaturwissenschaft 22.1 (2003): 38-48.
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